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Kerch failure

Kiev overheard the secret negotiations of Russian intelligence services

Literally the next day after the capture of Ukrainian boats and tugs in the territorial waters of the Russian Federation near the Kerch Strait, Kiev, in the framework of the “investigation”, posted a record of negotiations between the commanders of Russian ships. It is clear that only profitable fragments of these conversations were made public, but here’s the fact — how did Ukraine invade the broadcast of the special services during an operation that it is trying to use to its advantage? Why not used closed communication channels?


Alexander Zimovsky, a military historian, a specialist in providing high-quality multi-channel telephone communication in the highest levels of command and control comments on secret radio negotiations.


– Regarding the recording of radio communications, made during the Kerch provocation, and the subsequent publication of it in the media by the Ukrainian side, we can recall a couple of similar cases. First: during the war, the British gained access to the German ciphers and to the Enigma encryption machine. They intercepted and read the messages of the Germans, but used the intercepted information with extreme care so that the Germans did not guess that they were decoded. For this reason, Churchill gave the Luftwaffe to make an ashtray from the English city of Coventry. Although the British knew about the upcoming air attack. Officially, note, everything is denied to this day.


The second case is related to the hacking by Americans of Japanese ciphers, which were used in the Purple encryption machine. Again, not every Japanese correspondence revealed by the Americans was transferred to the Pacific fleets and troops. The information obtained was used very metered. It is believed that the Pearl Harbor disaster could not have happened, but the political leadership and command of the United States decided to restrain information about the Japanese attack. Officially, everything is denied, notice again.


– Alexander Leonidovich, Ukraine received the keys to access the Russian secret communication? After all, even the simplest radio interception requires technical equipment.


  • We will not be deceived – Ukraine simply does not have such means of interception, they squandered the legacy of the Soviet times. But there is an American “helping hand”. On the eve of the incident in the Kerch Strait, the Russian Su-27 drove here an ER-3E Aries radio reconnaissance aircraft of the US Navy, capable of listening for 400 kilometers. Not for nothing, right? It is likely that he also circled nearby that day. Then you will think about the words of the President of Bulgaria Rumen Radev, who said that he believes that third countries were involved in the incident in the Kerch Strait, and not only Russia and Ukraine. Who could it be? There is still another aspect. In the case of the Ukrainian publication of radio interception texts, we will not be able to understand the logic of non-professionals. As the actor Bronevoy in the role of the Gestapo chief Muller said: “A cunning professional would not merge interception”.


– Nevertheless, the interception of negotiations of the Russian special services and military sailors took place.


– It is believed that the radio frequencies used for negotiations of military, police, air traffic controllers, special services and other subjects involved in secret affairs, defense and life support of citizens and the state, are hidden from the general public by a curtain of secrecy. According to the documents it is.



However, any novice radio amateur first of all receives a notification (list of frequencies) that are officially banned for use by private individuals (radio amateurs) in Russia. Or the country where the citizen wanted to indulge in amateur radio. And this list clearly lists which radio frequencies are assigned to which department. Therefore, to establish the frequency of, say, police radios is technically easy.


Smugglers know the frequencies of border guards and customs. Poachers know the frequency of fish conservation. We know the frequency of negotiations of ships and aircraft of NATO and the United States. Ukrainians listen to Russian border guards. Israelis are listening to the Arabs and vice versa. All this makes sense, especially when open text negotiations are in progress at a closed frequency. We listen to “singing in the shower”, I will call it so. Therefore, the problem is not in calculating the necessary frequencies, this is just not a problem. The problem is that when creating secure communication systems, there are special requirements for providing high-speed data for tactical military


Therefore, the problem is not in calculating the necessary frequencies, this is just not a problem. The problem is that when creating secure communication systems, there are special requirements to ensure high-speed data transmission for tactical military purposes (in our case).


– However, sometimes the radio does not imply the presence of extraneous ears.


– In the conditions of modern combat, the transmission of information requires the presence of stable air and ground broadband radio communications. Communication equipment must transmit and receive voice, video, and electronic data at high speed, often in large spaces. And, of course, this relationship must be closed to the enemy. Simply put, it all comes down to protecting information.


Modern technology offers three areas:


  1. a) you are improving communications to protect information;


  1. b) you are improving communications software to protect information;


  1. you go through the creation of software and hardware ways to protect information during communication.


The deployment of additional forces in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States is called “deterrent military presence”.

Absolutely secure ciphers do not exist. Everything is decided by the time it takes to hack. This time determines the further course of events, since it directly affects the speed of analysis and subsequent decision-making on the battlefield. Yes, I will add that if you can not open the enemy communication system, then you can suppress it, interrupt or drown it. This should also be taken into account.


So far, both we and the Americans are moving in the same direction in order to organize secure communications during combat operations in the platoon-company-battalion and ship-to-ship level. In the US, it is a Joint Tactical Radio System based on proprietary network communication protocols.


Russia is developing an ERP technology (software-defined radio system) that allows it to support a wide range of the latest signal encoding and modulation techniques. These radio stations are classified as highly protected, and they are resistant to means of suppressing radio communications.


Well, the human factor is not forgotten. Ukrainians, they argue, have heard all the negotiations of Russian ships. So what? How did this affect the outcome of the Kerch provocation? Saved the Ukrainian sailors from shameful detention? Therefore, the only analogy that is suitable for describing how the Ukrainian side disposed of the radio data obtained during the interception is an analogy about a stupid man and a glass object, let’s say, from the fairy tale. How did he use it? Well, you understand … Just broke for fun.

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