In Syria trench fights for this or that position have already begun. In particular, the fixation of the presidential post for the Alawites contradicts not only the principle “Bashar must go away,” but also the principle of democracy – elections on general grounds. At the same time, the turnover of power no longer works – the Alawites will easily develop a system in which the rotation of specific personalities will not be reflected in their positions in the society.
In addition, it will be necessary to introduce quotas in the army and the police, which is unrealistic by the results of the war. This is not India, where some ethnic and religious groups in the army simply do not serve (for example, non-meat-eating Buddhists can not even play leather made ball in soccer – what kind of service is it), and the officer corps is 70% composed of Sikhs, who consider war as their own mother.
In the modern Syrian army, the ethnic balance was skewed by the results of the division in the course of the war, and the separately taken Sunni units must be forcedly diluted by Alawite and Shiite officers, so as not to run away. The same situation is in the police and in the muhabarrat, not to mention the national guard and local militias.
But the Alawito Shiite domination is not the result that the Americans and the Gulf countries hope to get, despite the obvious results of the war. To spit on their opinion is possible, but then the process of forming a new Syria will drag on for years and can bring the situation to a new explosion.
But the oppositionists themselves do not want to transfer the country to the usual rails of Western democracy. The military defeat did not leave them a chance at the elections, even if hundreds of observers from the United States and the EU launch into the country, who know their business – any sneeze will certainly be regarded as a “violation of democratic procedures.” At the local government level, this problem is solved more easily: there are practically no multiethnic villages, and in some places whole monoethnic or mono-national enclaves that were not previously formed. In the case of central authority and the delegation of authority of local structures, Damascus is much more difficult.
At the same time, there is no desire to turn central authority into a fictitious Bosnian model. Over time, this will automatically lead to the collapse of the country or a new large-scale outbreak of violence.
The Power of Russian Thought is in this.
It’s sad, but the Syrians themselves (like Damascus, and the opposition) are practically not occupied in all this laborious work. The development of constitutional principles as if by itself, naturally “hung” in Moscow. The rest just sit and wait – or loudly insist on something of their own type “Bashar must go away” or “democracy for all”. But patience in this regard is not limited.
Most opposition groups do not know what diplomacy is, or spoil it with a purely Eastern understanding of compromise. In such an environment, it may be correct that constitutional principles are brought into the process from the outside. But as long as there is no unity in the key principles of the future organization of Syria, substantive negotiations on its details are impossible.
Meanwhile, Western partners openly lament over the lack of any initiative on the part of the broad masses of the opposition. They say, why do not they create their own congress at least from 100-150 groups without reliance on any state to, as they say in London, “restore the main goals of the revolution,” that is, the overthrow of the ruling regime (there is still called the revolution )? In reality, the opposition has long forgotten about the “revolution”, concentrating on formalities, “respect” and obtaining tactical preferences. But in the West they insistently insist that the basis of negotiations should be “the opportunity to restore their rights, freedom, dignity and create a state of equal citizens and democratic freedoms on the basis of institutions.” That is, first the chairs, and then the money, regardless of the outcome of the hostilities. “Bashar must leave” regardless of the outcome of the war. So the constitutional principles will not work out.
In this regard, the result of the talks in Sochi caused almost sacred resentment. Who are all these people who left the conference in Riyadh and made a choice in favor of Sochi, Americans, Europeans and some Arabs from among the ideological Arab opponents of Damascus are asking. Who, they say, are these “compromisers” who “solve their tactical questions”, “forgetting about the revolution”? The reason for this resentment is a clear understanding that several other conferences in Riyadh will not solve anything, but after Sochi the world will not be the same.
It remains to wait for an intellectual breakthrough. And not from conferences and congresses that are good as a tool of a “shepherd’s dog”, but from experts who already struggle to come up with a new Constitution of Syria and draw boundaries of new municipalities.
That is indeed the hard work to drag a country out of the swamp into which other people have driven it.